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Book Reviews
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, Edited by Jacob S. Ziegel, Toronto:
Osgoode Hall Law School. 1973. Pp. 128 (Hardbound: $7.50; Paperback:
$4.00).
It is almost three years since Osgoode Hall Law School initiated what
has become a noteworthy programme of annual lectures designed to bring
to a wide public, both inside and outside the university, the views of in-
dividuals who have contributed through legal practice and scholarly research
to the exploration of the interface between law and society. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the first lectures, in the autumn and winter of 1971-
1972, should have tackled the engrossing subject of law and social change,
which is the title of a 1973 Osgoode publication incorporating the texts of
five lectures and three commentaries. The lectures do not systematically
attempt to cover the whole range of possible questions and they vary con-
siderably in length, content and approach, as indicated by their titles: Progress
and Professionalism: The Canadian Legal Profession in Transition, by H. W.
Arthurs; General Theory of Law and Social Change, by Lawrence M. Fried-
man; The Supreme Court of Canada and Canadian Federalism, by Paul C.
Weiler; The Role of the Public Inquiry in our Constitutional System, by
Gerald LeDain; and A Living Society is a Quarrelling Society, by Nils
Christie. While each article may be said to deal with some particular aspect
of the theme, two are of particular interest to a legally-trained social scientist;
namely, the two contributions from Arthurs and Friedman, both of which
take for their leitmotiv the state of the legal profession.
H. W. Arthurs is Dean of Osgoode Hall Law School, the nation's oldest
and largest common law school, and thus has a unique vantage point from
which to survey the current state of the profession in Canada. What he
offers is a trenchant diagnosis of the patient's ills and a sceptical prognosis
for the future. Borrowing Charles Reich's analysis of levels of consciousness,
he looks at the profession's values as they are expressed by several sub-
groups: students, professors, and lawyers. As Arthurs points out, these sub-
groups are also differentiated according to age, education and experience
although they all, to some degree or another, still accept the traditional in-
stitutional values of the legal system.
At the first level of consciousness one finds the expert practitioners,
(but few professors), concerned with and devoted to taxonomy, and acting
as the very prototype of the lawyer's lawyer. At the second level of Arthurs'
typology, we find those few lawyers (and many professors) who see law as
an aspect of public policy, joining in an uneasy alliance with those who
contend that only sound methodology can sustain an ideological stance.
Finally, at the third level, are those many students, few professors and almost
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no lawyers who see law as playing an empathetic role based on, and ful-
filling, interpersonal relationships.
Arthurs concludes that these levels of consciousness have produced a
continual identity crisis within the profession which is exciting but also suffi-
ciently enervating to have robbed the profession of intellectual depth, sure-
ness and maturity. But he goes further than a descriptive taxonomy of the
contemporary situation. He asserts that these differing levels of consciousness
are the product of the profession's first encounter with systematic theory -
without which a profession cannot call itself learned but the acquisition of
which depends on law professors. He also suggests that the profession could
more easily have come to terms with or absorbed the shock waves of this
encounter if it were not so young, if there had been a slower evolutionary
process of gradual development, adaptation and synthesis. But, as he notes,
our law schools as centres of full time instruction and research are very
young, our profession is not yet truly professionalized and our students are
no longer passive receivers of old truths.
Arthurs has thus accurately defined the dilemma: without devising or
coming to terms with a general unifying theory of law, the profession will
remain divided; but divided, it can hardly generate a theory. Is there a way
out of this circle? Arthurs wisely declines to speculate. I would suggest that
the profession may find an exit point when and as it recognizes and accepts
its diverse roles in society, since it is these roles which have given rise to the
differing levels of consciousness within the profession and which have in-
fluenced - far more strongly than lawyers might believe - the profession's
internal "legal" values or norms, as a collective group. There is an observable
distinction between the level of consciousness of an individual lawyer and
that of the professional group. Why not recognize that the distinction may
not only be valid but also necessary in a complex, changing, differentiated
society? By way of analogy, biology asserts that the greater the individual
variation among members of a species, the better the species as a whole will
meet the challenge of its environment, and survive to reproduce. If that is
the case, then it may be less useful to resolve intra-species, or intra-lawyer
differences than it may be imperative to speak to other 'species' in the
societal environment, whether they be doctors or Indian chiefs. That I think,
will lead to an open-ended debate about law 'in' society, law 'and' society,
law as product of social interests and law as molder of social values. -But I
have no doubt that lawyers, fortified by discussion of internal norms, can
tackle those salient questions in open public forum, as long as there are
several levels of consciousness, and not merely one.
If Arthurs has given us a typology of the profession from the insider
looking out, Friedman adjures us to look from the outside in - to consider
how and why the American lawyer has become a shaker and a changer par
excellence in a political and social culture that is, after all, more like than
unlike our own. Friedman begins his analysis with a statement which indi-
cates how far we have come; namely, that the subject of law and social
change is today a valid and important theme whereas as recently as thirty
years ago it stood at the fringe of academic interest in law. This interest
emerged for lawyers, but also for social scientists, for it was about this time
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that the social scientist began to see law as a legitimate and fruitful field for
study and research, recognizing its central importance in Western and non-
Western institutions and cultures. Friedman gives two reasons for this de-
velopment: first, the fact that there is social change on a vast scale and,
equally significant, that individuals are aware of change; and second, the
existence of a widely accepted conception of law as a social process.
These modern views of social change and law are a direct outgrowth of
the two great revolutions of nineteenth century Europe: the industrial revolu-
tion of Britain and the political revolution of France. The dynamism inherent
in both affected both Europe and the world, the latter mainly through the
political and economic instruments of colonial rule. Thus law and social
change is a subject of universal concern and enquiry, the more so because law
is perceived by modern governments as one of the most powerful instruments
with which to direct, initiate or restrict change.
But Friedman is talking about the contemporary American scene and
indeed that is probably the most significant theatre for an examination of
the topic. The United States is the legatee of the nineteenth century. It pro-
vided hospitable soil for the revolutions in ideas and institutions; it is the
home of diverse ethnic and racial groups and the testing ground for experi-
ments in social engineering and power distribution. And, if it is hardly ac-
curate to suggest that "what California is today, the rest will be tomorrow", it
is true that the United States warrants our keen attention. What Friedman
gives us is a most provocative and stimulating account of how lawyers act
as self-proclaimed makers of change. To do so, he asserts a social theory
of law to which the contemporary generation of lawyers is firmly wedded:
"a theory that law, whatever else it may be, is at least a product of general
social forces, moving along with them and interacting with society at every
point." (Page 20) But not all legal change is social change. In this category
falls much of the legal system's housekeeping activity, such as statutory
revision and codification, and ratification or "law reform", which simply
acknowledges, formally, a societal change which has already taken place.
In contradistinction, true social change through law may be described as
change which originates outside the legal system but which moves through
it to a point of impact outside the legal system; or, more rarely, creative
change which originates inside the legal system and has an impact outside it.
It is this type of change, where the point of impact is outside the system,
in society, that excites Friedman, and it is here that lawyers are much in
evidence, in numbers and in influence. It was not always so. The lawyers of
the old breed were tools of social change, not causes of it, men with skills
for sale, men whose professional training did not, on that account alone
make them social critics or reformers. But a new breed of lawyer is now
much in evidence as the "investigating generalist" and the "fire-eating
litigator." They are, by and large, committed to social planning and more
often to social disruption - these constituting the positive and negative
aspects of social change. In their commitment to this task, the new lawyers
have seized on the lawsuit as the form best suited to their temperaments and
their goals, litigation being an old and well-tried technique for social change
in America. The examples are numerous: the reformation of the rights of
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criminal defendants, the battering down of racial and sexual discrimination,
the redefinition of the fourteenth amendment.
But Friedman goes further than this analysis. He asks whether this
brand of social change is, or should be, an export commodity. Fully ap-
preciative of the difficulties of supplying an answer, he outlines the social
conditions under which lawyers might breed social change. In other words,
he provides a checklist, based on American experience, of those social pre-
conditions which may constitute a necessary and even sufficient soil for the
growth of this new technique. Obviously one needs the products of law
schools - "a steady supply of bright, turned-on, active, willing, workers" -
as well as persons willing to engage in these forms of litigation, and a social
soil which combines a widespread scepticism about the status quo, a sus-
picion that all is not right, and a willingness to listen to muckrakers. But
beyond this marriage of public malaise and individual discontent, Friedman
postulates a set of conditions for the health and welfare of the litigator who
is the linchpin of the attack on the social Bastille: first, a ready supply of
money from those who want change; second, a genuine social movement
(and there are many such "causes" in a complex and disgruntled society);
third, an activist bar which permits social action and does not and cannot
punish activists; fourth, an activist bench, willing to use its power; and fifth,
the acquiescence of the 6ite in the results of litigation, which implies that
they maintain at least a vestigial belief in legal institutons, and the tendency
of those institutions to do "the right thing".
Finally, Friedman tentatively compares the British and Canadian cul-
tures with the American, searching to discover whether their legal systems
and lawyers now constitute a social soil ready for the implantation of some
version of the American style of law as maker of social change. He con-
cludes that indeed this style is likely to find echoes, if not imitations, abroad.
He does not doubt that society must move in a progressive direction or else
be doomed, and that social change is inevitable. The only variable, then,
is the role of lawyers and the law.
What might the Canadian version be? Jeffrey Jowell in his comment
tackles this head on by asserting that avant-garde lawyering is neither in-
evitable nor desirable in Canada. He suggests, in brief, that legal institutions
are not the obvious or most effective way to achieve social change, and that
indeed the political system is, potentially, more sensitive to social injustice
and capable of more effective positive change than its American counterpart.
But Jowell is also quick to point out that while the broad social culture may
be more conciliatory in nature, the Canadian legal culture could stand some
searching re-examination. He suggests, for example, that existing legal
remedies may be deficient, in form and in effect, and hints that we would not
suffer if we possessed a more activist bench and bar.
To place Arthurs' diagnosis of the legal profession in the context of
Friedman's theory is a challenge which I hope others will take up, and should
take up. For my part, I take Arthurs' description of the collision of Canadian
legal values as a confirmation of the fact that the seedbed for the "new wave"
in lawyering may by now be well watered and ready for planting, notwith-
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standing a social and political culture which Canadians too contentedly
believe is readily distinguishable from that of the United States. In the first
place, the profession may be, as Arthurs asserts, in a state of clinical shock
after its first real encounter with systematic theory. If that is so, then it can-
not, nor should not, resist the persistent leakage of ideas and techniques from
the United States. In the second place, do Canadian lawyers really want to
turn their backs on the inevitable challenge of developing an indigenous
response to the universal thrust of social change? I think some do: they re-
emphasize and sharpen the tools of a conservative craftsmanship. But this
cannot satisfy a growing number of individuals within and without the
profession who do see law as a social instrument. Indeed, it is not unlikely
that Canada's Ralph Nader is about to graduate from some Canadian law
school this spring.
To put forward such a view is to invite discussion on the possibility or
necessity of constructing a viable general theory of law, within the context
of a science of society. That will not be easy, for I think it accurate to state
that there is no sociology of law, no anthropology of law, no political science
of law - at least not yet. But there are fruitful attempts to describe how and
why lawyers function as a group and as members of cultures, societies and
states. As for "law", that bundle of practices and ideals, cause and effec%
which cannot be caught in any simplistic definition or network of empirical
data, we must be prepared to undertake a long voyage, like that of Darwin
on the "Beagle", observing, describing, testing, hypothesizing, rejecting, re-
fining. Law may well be the unique challenge to social science: it is a happy
hunting ground for the positivist as he examines what actually happens in
court, and a rich source for the idealist contemplating what is just about
justice. I do not think that other "learned" professions can greatly assist us.
But I hold firmly to the opinion that for those of us who think about law
and social change the first step must surely be a more concerted effort to
expand the range and elevate the level of discourse between lawyers and
social scientists. Perhaps we will only be emboldened to ask simple questions
about complex phenomena, but we might also better understand if and how.
the Canadian legal profession can develop an indigenous variation of Fried-
man's general theory.
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